Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 8:35 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
"The usual commentarial stuff" is the actual subject.


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 1:53 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Non-traditional traditionalists....

Anyhoo, the Metteyya reply was my apparently meager attempt to inject a bit of levity into this thread after the fire and brimstone sermons.


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 1:43 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Hi Sylvester,

Yes, I followed your analysis of the two sutta-s. But it seems to me, as I replied above, given that SN 48.38 states that the sukhindriya and somanassindriya are both sukha vedanā and the dukkhindriya and domanassindriya are both dukkha vedanā, therefore, based on the analysis of this vibhaṅga sutta the sukha and dukkha arising from mind-contact in MN 148 are actually somanassa and domanassa. They are both cetasika vedanā arising from manosamphassa. Neither of them are kāyika vedanā followed by cetasika vedanā.

Do you have a third sutta source which specifically states that vedanā arising from manosamphassa is kāyika?

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 10:28 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Um, why don't you tell me?...


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 10:00 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Apparently, from the traditional point of view there's no possibility of liberation anymore in this world anyway. So it's probably better for traditionalists to follow Ven. Buddhaghoṣa's lead and generate merit &amp; aspire for a heavenly rebirth to await Metteyya's awakening.


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jul 04, 2010 8:23 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
My reading of the above sutta-s doesn’t entail this consequence.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sat Jul 03, 2010 6:33 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Hi Sylvester,

I don’t for a moment doubt your sincerity and good intentions, but it’s pretty apparent to me that we will never come to an agreement on this issue. And that’s fine. We approach the subject with different hermeneutics, and that has consequences which would take more time and effort to sort through than I am willing to invest. I approach the Pāḷi sutta-s with a methodology similar to the following statement by professor Lambert Schmithausen:
I presuppose that the texts I make use of are to be taken seriously, in the sense that one has to accept that they mean what they say, and that what they mean is reasonable within its own terms.

I do appreciate you input and find it helpful, but I believe that my reading of the sutta material pertaining to this subject is at this point consistent and displays the internal harmony and integral structure of the eightfold path as it was put together by the compilers of the sutta-s.

It seems to me that your interpretation requires some hermeneutical gymnastics to make the sutta-s accord with your understanding of the Visuddhimagga. In the process there seems to be an assumption that straightforward passages don’t mean what they say, or aren’t inclusive of enough variables to be meaningful. Moreover, it seems that you read into the sutta-s definitions and processes according to classical abhidhammika developments (eg. terms like vitakka and processes such as the cognitive series). There is nothing wrong with this approach per se, but in my opinion it will never sufficiently interpret the thought-world of the sutta era strata of received tradition. (And you may very well disagree with this assertion as well.)

Anyway, for your enjoyment, here’s the relevant passage from the (Mahā)Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta commentary. (This section is the same in both the Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā and the Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā):
Sāmisaṃ vā sukhantiādīsu sāmisā sukhā nāma pañcakāmaguṇāmisasannissitā cha gehasitasomanassavedanā. Nirāmisā sukhā nāma cha nekkhammasitasomanassavedanā. Sāmisā dukkhā nāma cha gehasitadomanassavedanā. Nirāmisā dukkhā nāma cha nekkhammasitadomanassavedanā. 

Ven. Ānandajoti tr: Sensual pleasant and so on - “sensual pleasant” is a name for the five strands of sensuality dependent on the sensual, and the six happy feelings connected with the life of the householder; “spiritual pleasant” is a name for the six happy feelings connected with the life of renunciation; “sensual unpleasant” is a name for the six sorrowful feelings connected with the life of the householder; “spiritual unpleasant” is a name for the six sorrowful feelings connected with the life of renunciation.

Ven. Soma Thera tr: Pleasant worldly feeling refers to the six joyful feelings connected with the six sense-doors, and dependent on that which is tainted by defilements. Pleasant spiritual feeling refers to the six joyful feelings connected with the six sense-doors, and not dependent on sense-desire. Painful worldly feeling refers to the six feelings of grief connected with the six sense-doors, and dependent on that which is tainted by defilements. Painful spiritual feeling refers to the six feelings of grief connected with the six sense-doors, and not dependent on sense-desire.

Neither of these translations are satisfactory, but you know Pāḷi (or enough Pāḷi) to comprehend. Anyway, even though this commentarial analysis interprets all four as either somanassa or domanassa, it allows for six types for both carnal and non-carnal (one of which should be dependent on body-contact at some point in the cognitive series). The narrowing of sukha and dukkha to somanassa and domanassa can be traced back to the Dhammasaṅgaṇi and later commentarial developments. Of course, IMO it doesn’t represent an accurate treatment of the subject in terms of a suttantika based analysis.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sat Jul 03, 2010 6:18 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
To approach this by way of experience: taste it yourself and see. Afterward you can superimpose whatever conceptual filters that you wish. Or you might even be able to drop the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether. BTW, according to the discourses, mental proliferation is a bad thing. 

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sat Jul 03, 2010 11:51 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
No doubt, the abbhidhamma project was well-intentioned, but I would suggest that the entire enterprise was also ill-conceived. The very notion that all of the corners of samsaric cognition can be “squared” is to miss the point that samsaric consciousness is deluded from the get-go, and therefore can’t be unequivocally validated in terms of the individuation of empirical particulars (whether as things or event-processes). This very process is itself part of the problem, not the solution.

Moreover, attempts to account for liberated cognition in terms of the fabricated aggregates misses the point stated in many sutta-s that such cannot be done. For example, the mind liberated through discernment is designated as “measureless mind” (appamāṇacetasa) in a number of discourses (S iv 119, S iv 186, S iv 189, S iv 199, MN 38). Elsewhere it is designated as unestablished (appatiṭṭha), and featureless (anidassana), and one thus liberated is said to be independent (anissita), etc.

One of the most elegant and subtle aspects of the dhamma of the sutta portion of the Nikāya-s is that it doesn’t impose any sort of fabricated view regarding the nature of the liberated mind. This is clear in the sense of measureless mind → appamāṇacetasa, being free from any sort of measurement → pamāṇa.

Once all mental designations (pannatti; also saṅkhā, samannā, etc.) are done away with, there is no way (and no need) for defining liberation in any way at all. This is a “freedom of absence.” It is also non-proliferation (nippapanca: “Dhammo nippapancaratino, nāyaṃ dhammo papancārāmassa papancaratino.”), etc.

This is what distinguishes the exquisite dhamma of the sutta-s from everything that came before the Buddha or after the sutta corpus. It’s unfortunate that virtually all commentators – early abhidhamma, classical, and modern commentators – and all Buddhist doctrinal schools haven’t seen fit to follow the Buddha’s wisdom on these points.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sat Jul 03, 2010 11:08 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
There are a few short references to the theory of momentariness in the main commentaries. Spk ii 266:
Hence the Ancients said: ‘Arising was called birth and dissolution referred to passing away. Change referred to aging and endurance to maintenance.’

Thus each khandha has three characteristic marks called arising, aging and dissolution, of which it is said in the passage (A I 152): ‘These are, monks, the three conditioned characteristic marks of the conditioned [khandha].’

Tenāhu porāṇā uppādo jāti akkhāto bhaṅgo vutto vayoti ca aññathattaṃ jarā vuttā ṭhitī ca anupālanā ti evaṃ ekekassa khandhassa uppādajarābhaṅgasaṅkhātāni tīṇi lakkhaṇānī ti.

And Mp ii 252:
Origination is said to appear at the origination moments, aging at the subsistence moments and dissolution at the destruction moments.

Uppādo ti jāti vayo ti bhedo ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ nāma jarā … uppādādayo saṅkhatalakkhaṇā nāma tesu uppādakkaṇe uppādo thānakkaṇe jarā bhedakkhaṇe vayo.

Also, Ācariya Ānanda (medieval period VbhAA.) cites the Abhidhamma Yamaka as canonical support for his understanding of radical momentariness. The Yamaka does use the terms arising moment (uppādakkhaṇa) and dissolution moment (bhaṅgakkhaṇa), even if these terms do not necessarily entail interpreting khaṇa as radical momentariness in the Yamaka itself.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 4:49 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Because SN 48.37 expressly differentiates between kāyika/cetasika and kāyosamphassa/manosamphassa with regard to the feeling faculties.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 2:56 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi Ven. Yuttadhammo,

I'd suggest that it's telling of the confusion created by the Visuddhimagga's convoluted treatment of the issue.

It's surely better, instead of attempting to confirm any particular point of view, to clarify sammāsamādhi so that there is no need for any unnecessary "struggle."

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 2:44 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
BTW, if it's a misreading (and I'm not saying that it is or isn't) it's Mahāsi Sayādaw's misreading. Visuddhiñāṇakathā, section on bhayatupaṭṭhāñāṇa:
At that time, his mind itself is gripped by fear and seems helpless.

And from the endnotes of this section (written by Ven. Ñāṇapoṇika Thera, but carefully scrutinized by Mahāsi Sayādaw):
The word bhaya has the subjective aspect of fear and the objective aspect of fearfulness, danger. Both are included in the significance of the term in this context.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 2:24 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi Mike,

I would consider this to be nothing more than conceptual proliferation. How is one to directly cognize or even infer the cessation of the four internal elements based on the movements of the body? It isn't empirically possible, nor is it inferentially valid. It is purely a conceptual filter which has no practical application.

Ven. Buddhaghoṣa, Vism 8.39:
As to the shortness of the moment: in the ultimate sense the life-moment of living beings is extremely short, being only as much as the occurrence of a single conscious moment. Just as a chariot wheel, when it is rolling, rolls [that is, touches the ground] only on one point of [the circumference of] its tyre, and, when it is at rest, rests only on one point, so too, the life of living beings lasts only for a single conscious moment. When that consciousness has ceased, the being is said to have ceased....

I would suggest that there is no "in the ultimate sense" with regard to cognition based on the individuation of particulars, and that "the occurrence of a single conscious moment" is mere designation, just as "being" is mere designation. Neither can be discerned when one applies vipassanā thoroughly.

All the best,

Geoff

[Edit: typo]


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 6:50 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
I think it's a good idea to try to keep things objective as possible by referring to the texts and other citations. This can hopefully avoid any appeals to personal experience. But I have a few friends who either used to practice Burmese vipassanā or who still do. And I specifically based that "existential tizzy" phrase on the memory of a few discussions I had in the past on the subject. I do appreciate you bringing it to my attention. It was a poor choice of words and I should have recognized it at the time. 

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jul 02, 2010 12:49 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
All of 'em!...  With regard to saṅkhāra-s, the relative alteration while persisting (ṭhitassa aññathatta) during any sensory contact is the same for the momentary flux of the feeling, the apperception, and the sensory consciousness (even though this flux cannot be quantified, i.e. the immediate experiential present cannot be measured). If there is an abrupt change in feeling, for example, from pleasure to pain, even if we conventionally designate the sensory object as the same referent, something has occurred even at the level of sensory consciousness which would be most accurately designated as a passing away of one process of sensory cognition and the arising of another (which still doesn't entail radical momentariness).

This is why designation is such a slippery snake at any level of reference, no matter how reductionist we choose to be. What we designate as an object is just a phantom with no real referent that can ultimately be established. The same is true for all of the dhamma-s of each of the aggregates. And the same is true for any experiential measurement of duration. The closer we look, the more elusive the referent. Until eventually we see through the cruel game of tyrannical empiricism altogether....

If I've misunderstood what you were asking, we can try again.

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 10:02 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
In that case, here's an idea: don't read my posts. 

Be well.


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 9:41 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Hi Sylvester,

Regarding the Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta (SN 48.40). since it is speaking specifically about the five feeling indriya-s in relation to the jhāna-s, if we first look at what other sutta-s have to tell us on these specific points, then we can find a very satisfactory reading of the Uppaṭipāṭika Sutta.

First, if we look at AN 9.42 it tells us that the pleasure commonly referred to in the descriptions of the third jhāna is actually the pleasure of equanimity (upekkhāsukha). This accords well with SN 48.40, when it states that the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) ceases in the third jhāna. What remains is the equanimity faculty (upekkhindriya) and the happiness faculty (somanassindriya), which in light of SN 48.37, in the third jhāna refers to bodily equanimity (kāya upekkhā) and mental pleasure (cetasika sukha).

And when SN 48.40 tells us that the happiness faculty (somanassindriya) ceases in the fourth jhāna, what remains is both bodily and mental equanimity (kāya &amp; cetasika upekkhā) as stated in SN 48.37.

With regard to the formless attainments, since MN 43 states that it is with the attainment of the fully purified formless apperception attainments that the mind is isolated from the five sense faculties and AN 9.37 states that the same is the case with regard to the experience of the five sensory spheres, we can deduce from this that with entrance into the formless attainments bodily equanimity (kāya upekkhā) is no longer experienced, and what remains is mental equanimity (cetasika upekkhā). And as SN 48.40 states, the equanimity faculty, i.e. mental equanimity, ceases with the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling.

Once again the sutta-s explicate themselves, revealing an integral symmetry and remarkably high degree of internal coherence. 

Also, if we look at some discourses where the reference is specifically to the first satipaṭṭhāna, then it becomes clear that the meaning of kāya in the context of jhāna doesn't entail interpreting it in terms of nāmakāya, and in fact to interpret it as nāmakāya is completely uncalled for. As an example, MN 125:
Then the Tathagata trains him further: 'Come, monk, remain focused on the body in &amp; of itself, but do not think any thoughts connected with the body.' (Tamenaṃ tathāgato uttariṃ vineti – 'ehi tvaṃ, bhikkhu, kāye kāyānupassī viharāhi , mā ca kāmūpasaṃhitaṃ vitakkaṃ vitakkesi.') ... With the stilling of directed thoughts &amp; evaluations, he enters &amp; remains in the second jhāna: rapture &amp; pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought &amp; evaluation — internal assurance.

And AN 8.63:
You should train yourself thus: ‘I will remain focused on the body in &amp; of itself — ardent, alert, &amp; mindful — putting aside greed &amp; distress with reference to the world.’ That's how you should train yourself. When you have developed this concentration in this way, you should develop this concentration with directed thought &amp; evaluation, you should develop it with no directed thought &amp; a modicum of evaluation, you should develop it with no directed thought &amp; no evaluation, you should develop it accompanied by rapture... not accompanied by rapture... endowed with a sense of enjoyment; you should develop it endowed with equanimity. (Evaṃ sikkhitabbaṃ: ‘kāye kāyānupassī viharissāmi ātāpī sampajāno satimā, vineyya loke abhijjhādomanassa’nti. Evañhi te, bhikkhu, sikkhitabbaṃ. Yato kho te, bhikkhu, ayaṃ samādhi evaṃ bhāvito hoti bahulīkato, tato tvaṃ, bhikkhu, imaṃ samādhiṃ savitakkasavicārampi bhāveyyāsi, avitakkavicāramattampi bhāveyyāsi, avitakkaavicārampi bhāveyyāsi, sappītikampi bhāveyyāsi, nippītikampi bhāveyyāsi, sātasahagatampi bhāveyyāsi, upekkhāsahagatampi bhāveyyāsi.

And AN 1.227:
When one thing is practiced &amp; pursued, the body is calmed (kāya passambhati), the mind is calmed (citta passambhati), thinking &amp; evaluating are stilled (vitakkavicārā vūpasama), and all qualities on the side of clear knowing go to the culmination of their development. Which one thing? Mindfulness immersed in the body (kāyagatāsati).

Etc....

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 1:26 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
What you are describing is a case of being "stuck internally" (MN 138). Such a description of jhāna as sammāsamādhi cannot be sustained by a close reading of the sutta-s.


Phenomena present and abandoned in each jhāna

• the five hindrances are abandoned (pañcanīvaraṇā): sensual desire (kāmacchanda), aversion (vyāpāda), dullness and drowsiness (thīnamiddha), restlessness and anxiety (uddhaccakukkucca), doubt (vicikicchā) [MN 43]


1st jhāna:

• pain faculty ceases (dukkhindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any physical pain, physical discomfort born of body-contact to be experienced as pain and discomfort [SN 48.37]

• apperception of sensual pleasure ceases (kāmasaññā) [DN 9, AN 9.31]; sensual pleasure (kāma) is the resolve of passion (saṅkapparāga) [AN 6.63]

• unskillful resolves cease (akusalā saṅkappā), which are the resolves of sensual pleasure, aversion, harmfulness (kāmasaṅkappa, byāpādasaṅkappa, vihiṃsāsaṅkappa) [MN 117]

• sign of first jhāna (nimitta): the first jhāna which includes directed thought and evaluation, as well as rapture and pleasure born of seclusion; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]

• directed thought and evaluation are present (vitakkavicārā) [DN 22: standard jhāna formula]

• non-carnal rapture and pleasure are present (nirāmisā pīti, nirāmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]

• actual refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion is present (vivekajapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā) [DN 9]

• rapture of seclusion (viveka pīti): When a noble disciple enters and remains in the rapture of seclusion, at that time five things do not occur for him: (1) pain and unhappiness connected with sensual pleasure do not exist at that time; (2) pleasure and happiness connected with sensual pleasure do not exist at that time; (3) pain and unhappiness connected with the unskillful do not exist at that time; (4) pleasure and happiness connected with the unskillful do not exist at that time; (5) pain and unhappiness connected with the skillful do not exist at that time. [AN 5.176]

• clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassanā): Whatever mental phenomena there are in the first jhāna: directed thought, evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, apperception, intention, mind, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, and attention; he ferreted them out one after another. Known to him they arose, known to him they remained, known to him they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play. Having been, they vanish.' (Ye ca paṭhame jhāne dhammā vitakko ca vicāro ca pīti ca sukhañca cittekaggatā ca, phasso vedanā saññā cetanā cittaṃ chando adhimokkho vīriyaṃ sati upekkhā manasikāro – tyāssa dhammā anupadavavatthitā honti. Tyāssa dhammā viditā uppajjanti, viditā upaṭṭhahanti, viditā abbhatthaṃ gacchanti. So evaṃ pajānāti – ‘evaṃ kirame dhammā ahutvā sambhonti, hutvā paṭiventi.) [MN 111]

• seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): He sees whatever phenomena there that are connected with form, feeling, apperception, fabrications, and consciousness, as impermanent, unsatisfactory, a disease, a cancer, an arrow, painful, an affliction, alien, a disintegration, an emptiness, not-self. (So yadeva tattha hoti rūpagataṃ vedanāgataṃ saññāgataṃ saṅkhāragataṃ viññāṇagataṃ, te dhamme aniccato dukkhato rogato gaṇḍato sallato aghato ābādhato parato palokato suññato anattato samanupassati.) [MN 64, AN 9.36]


2nd jhāna:

• unhappiness faculty ceases (domanassindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any mental pain, mental discomfort born of mind-contact to be experienced as pain and discomfort [SN 48.37]

• directed thought and evaluation ceases (vitakkavicārā) [AN 9.31]

• skillful resolves cease (kusalā saṅkappā), which are the resolves of renunciation, non-aversion, harmlessness (nekkhammasaṅkappa, abyāpādasaṅkappa, avihiṃsāsaṅkappa) [MN 117]

• sign of second jhāna (nimitta): the second jhāna which has internal serene-clarity and unification of mind free from thought and evaluation, and has rapture and pleasure born of concentration; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]

• non-carnal rapture and pleasure are present (nirāmisā pīti, nirāmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]

• actual refined apperception of rapture and pleasure born of concentration is present (samādhijapītisukhasukhumasaccasaññā) [DN 9]

• clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassanā): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]

• seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]


3rd jhāna:

• pleasure faculty ceases (sukhindriya) [SN 48.40, AN 9.31] which is any physical pleasure, physical comfort born of body-contact to be experienced as pleasure and comfort [SN 48.37]

• sign of third jhāna (nimitta): he remains equanimous, mindful and fully aware, and experiences pleasure with the body; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]

• pleasure of equanimity is present (upekkhāsukha) [AN 9.42]

• non-carnal pleasure is present (nirāmisa sukha) [SN 36.31]

• actual refined apperception of equanimity is present (upekkhāsukhasukhumasaccasaññā) [DN 9]

• clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassanā): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]

• seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]


4th jhāna:

• happiness faculty ceases (somanassindriya) [SN 48.40] which is any mental pleasure, mental comfort born of mind-contact to be experienced as pleasure and comfort [SN 48.37]

• in and out breathing has been calmed, has been stilled, has ceased (assāsapassāsā) [SN 36.11, AN 9.31]

• sign of fourth jhāna (nimitta): the fourth jhāna, which is without pleasure or pain, and includes the purity of equanimity and mindfulness; he sticks with that sign, develops it, pursues it, and establishes himself firmly in it [AN 9.35]

• non-carnal equanimity is present (nirāmisā upekkhā) [SN 36.31]

• actual refined apperception of neither pleasure nor pain is present (adukkhamasukhasukhumasaccasaññā) [DN9]

• apperception of form is present (rūpasaññā) [AN 9.42]

• clear seeing of mental phenomena one by one as they occur (anupadadhammavipassanā): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 111]

• seeing the three characteristics of the five aggregates (samanupassati): same as first jhāna minus eliminated mental phenomena [MN 64, AN 9.36]


Formless attainments:

• only when abiding in the fully purified formless attainments is the mind isolated from the five sense faculties [MN 43] and does not experience any of the five sensory spheres [AN 9.37]


Attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling:

• equanimity faculty ceases (upekkhindriya) [SN 48.40]

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 12:59 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
It's your life. Nevertheless, some people are interested in a dhamma which is both cogent and practical. In fact, incoherence simply cannot be practical. Speaking on the very practical matter of how the Visuddhimagga jhāna-s bear no resemblance to how this very essential component of practice is integrated into the sutta presentation of the noble eightfold path, Ven. Ṭhānissaro adds:
Some Theravadins insist that questioning the commentaries is a sign of disrespect for the tradition, but it seems to be a sign of greater disrespect for the Buddha – or the compilers of the Canon – to assume that he or they would have left out something absolutely essential to the practice.

Being cynical and dismissive of the usefulness of well-considered demonstrations regarding where the commentaries have veered away from experience and pragmatic soteriology seems to me to be a rather rigid approach. You can ignore it if you so choose, but there is an elephant in the living room.

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 1:30 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Hi Brizzy,

Indeed. It’s worth noting just how closely related mindfulness of the body (kāyānupassanā, kāyagatāsati) and the mental factors of mindfulness and full awareness (sati and sampajañña) are to the development of the four jhāna-s. This can be seen from the following sutta excerpts.
You should train yourself thus: ‘I will remain focused on the body in &amp; of itself — ardent, alert, &amp; mindful — putting aside greed &amp; distress with reference to the world.’ That's how you should train yourself. When you have developed this concentration in this way, you should develop this concentration with directed thought &amp; evaluation, you should develop it with no directed thought &amp; a modicum of evaluation, you should develop it with no directed thought &amp; no evaluation, you should develop it accompanied by rapture... not accompanied by rapture... endowed with a sense of enjoyment; you should develop it endowed with equanimity. [AN 8.63]

Monks, those monks who are trainees, who have not attained their mind’s ideal, who dwell aspiring for the unsurpassed security from bondage – they too dwell contemplating the body in the body, ardent, alert, unified, with limpid mind, concentrated, with one-pointed mind, in order to fully understand the body as it really is. [SN 47.4]

When one thing is practiced &amp; pursued, the body is calmed (kāya passambhati), the mind is calmed (citta passambhati), thinking &amp; evaluating are stilled (vitakkavicārā vūpasama), and all qualities on the side of clear knowing go to the culmination of their development. Which one thing? Mindfulness immersed in the body (kāyagatāsati). [AN 1.227]

And how is mindfulness immersed in the body developed, how is it pursued, so as to be of great fruit &amp; great benefit?

There is the case where a monk — having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an empty building — sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the fore. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out.

Breathing in long, he discerns that he is breathing in long; or breathing out long, he discerns that he is breathing out long. Or breathing in short, he discerns that he is breathing in short; or breathing out short, he discerns that he is breathing out short. He trains himself to breathe in sensitive to the entire body and to breathe out sensitive to the entire body. He trains himself to breathe in calming bodily fabrication (the breath) and to breathe out calming bodily fabrication. And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, &amp; resolute, any memories &amp; resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers &amp; settles inwardly, grows unified &amp; centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body (kāyagatāsati). [MN 119]

Having abandoned the five hindrances — imperfections of awareness that weaken discernment — the monk remains focused on the body in &amp; of itself — ardent, alert, &amp; mindful — putting aside greed &amp; distress with reference to the world. [MN 125]

As he remains thus focused on the body in &amp; of itself, his mind becomes concentrated, his defilements are abandoned. He takes note of that fact.... As a result, he is rewarded with a pleasant abiding here &amp; now, together with mindfulness &amp; alertness (satisampajañña). [SN 47.8]

Seeing that they have been abandoned within him, he becomes glad. Glad, he becomes enraptured. Enraptured, his body grows tranquil (pītimanassa kāyo passambhati). His body tranquil, he is sensitive to pleasure (passaddhakāyo sukhaṃ vedeti). Feeling pleasure, his mind becomes concentrated (sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyati). [DN 2]

Furthermore, quite withdrawn from sensuality, withdrawn from unskillful mental qualities, he enters &amp; remains in the first jhāna: rapture &amp; pleasure born from withdrawal, accompanied by directed thought &amp; evaluation. He permeates &amp; pervades, suffuses &amp; fills this very body with the rapture &amp; pleasure born from withdrawal. Just as if a skilled bathman or bathman's apprentice would pour bath powder into a brass basin and knead it together, sprinkling it again &amp; again with water, so that his ball of bath powder — saturated, moisture-laden, permeated within &amp; without — would nevertheless not drip; even so, the monk permeates... this very body with the rapture &amp; pleasure born of withdrawal. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by rapture &amp; pleasure born from withdrawal. And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, &amp; resolute, any memories &amp; resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers &amp; settles inwardly, grows unified &amp; centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body (kāyagatāsati). [MN 119]

Then the Tathagata trains him further: 'Come, monk, remain focused on the body in &amp; of itself, but do not think any thoughts connected with the body.....' With the stilling of directed thoughts &amp; evaluations, he enters &amp; remains in the second jhāna: rapture &amp; pleasure born of composure, unification of awareness free from directed thought &amp; evaluation — internal assurance. [MN 125]

He permeates &amp; pervades, suffuses &amp; fills this very body with the rapture &amp; pleasure born of composure. Just like a lake with spring-water welling up from within, having no inflow from the east, west, north, or south, and with the skies supplying abundant showers time &amp; again, so that the cool fount of water welling up from within the lake would permeate &amp; pervade, suffuse &amp; fill it with cool waters, there being no part of the lake unpervaded by the cool waters; even so, the monk permeates... this very body with the rapture &amp; pleasure born of composure. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by rapture &amp; pleasure born of composure. And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, &amp; resolute, any memories &amp; resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers &amp; settles inwardly, grows unified &amp; centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body.

And furthermore, with the fading of rapture, he remains equanimous, mindful, &amp; alert (upekkhā, sati, sampajāna), and senses pleasure with the body (sukhañca kāyena paṭisaṃvedeti). He enters &amp; remains in the third jhāna, of which the Noble Ones declare, 'Equanimous &amp; mindful (upekkhako sati), he has a pleasant abiding.' 

He permeates &amp; pervades, suffuses &amp; fills this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture. Just as in a lotus pond, some of the lotuses, born &amp; growing in the water, stay immersed in the water and flourish without standing up out of the water, so that they are permeated &amp; pervaded, suffused &amp; filled with cool water from their roots to their tips, and nothing of those lotuses would be unpervaded with cool water; even so, the monk permeates... this very body with the pleasure divested of rapture. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded with pleasure divested of rapture. And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, &amp; resolute, any memories &amp; resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers &amp; settles inwardly, grows unified &amp; centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body.

And furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure &amp; pain — as with the earlier disappearance of elation &amp; distress — he enters &amp; remains in the fourth jhāna: purity of equanimity &amp; mindfulness (upekkhāsatipārisuddhi), neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness. And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, &amp; resolute, any memories &amp; resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers &amp; settles inwardly, grows unified &amp; centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body. [MN 119]

On seeing a form with the eye, he does not lust after it if it is pleasing; he does not dislike it if it is unpleasing. He abides with mindfulness of the body established (kāyagatāsati), with an immeasurable mind, and he understands as it actually is the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder. Having thus abandoned favoring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, he does not delight in that feeling, welcome it, or remain holding to it. As he does not do so, delight in feelings ceases in him. With the cessation of his delight comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of being; with the cessation of being, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.

On hearing a sound with the ear....
On smelling an odor with the nose....
On tasting a flavor with the tongue....
On touching a tactile sensation with the body....

On cognizing a mind-object with the mind, he does not lust after it if it is pleasing; he does not dislike it if it is unpleasing. He abides with mindfulness of the body established, with an immeasurable mind, and he understands as it actually is the deliverance of mind and deliverance by wisdom wherein those evil unwholesome states cease without remainder. Having thus abandoned favoring and opposing, whatever feeling he feels, whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant, he does not delight in that feeling, welcome it, or remain holding to it. As he does not do so, delight in feelings ceases in him. With the cessation of his delight comes cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of being; with the cessation of being, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging and death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering. [MN 38]

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jul 01, 2010 1:19 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
I'm always reticent to discuss these things too openly where anyone can read it. It one sense, this is a private and personal matter to be discussed with one's teacher and closest dhamma friends.... Anyway, the specifics can vary, but I'll try to offer a brief description.

Prior to the arising of pītisukha, the inner felt-sense of the entire body is experienced as a continual flux of subtle vibrational energy-sensations flowing throughout the whole body. It's important for awareness to be expansive enough so that it can experience the entire body without it collapsing into attending to any specific tactile sensations. The body is calm and the mind is wide open and at ease. By remaining aware in this way, pītisukha eventually arises spontaneously as waves of universal bliss coursing throughout the body. It feels like passing through an invisible 'membrane' wherein all sense of constriction is simply gone and the felt-sense of the body vastly expands along with waves of universal bliss.

But no part of this experience is static. There is a vast, expansive flowing of waves of pītisukha (it's really beyond what can be described in words to anyone who hasn't experienced it). Anyway, that's what I call the characteristic of momentary flux of pītisukha.

If this isn't helpful to you then disregard it.

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 30, 2010 9:12 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Hi Mike,

I'm not interested in pointless debate either. And I've already offered my opinion as well as the basis for that opinion (i.e. the Visuddhiñāṇakathā). From what I can gather, you practice the Burmese vipassanā method, and so I'm interested in hearing what your opinion is. I personally see no need to attempt to establish a "correct" interpretation in regard to this question. But I'm quite interested in what others have to say, especially those practicing Burmese vipassanā. It's an opportunity for me to further my own understanding of the tradition.

Thanks,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 30, 2010 9:03 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Hi Robert,

That may very well be the case. Could you elaborate on what you see as the differences between the commentaries and Mahāsi Sayādaw's Visuddhiñāṇakathā?

Thanks,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 30, 2010 8:05 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Would you not agree that bhangānupassanāñāṇa and bhayatupaṭṭhāñāṇa can induce existential anxiety, distress, agitation, angst, fear, dread, terror, confusion, helplessness, etc.?


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 30, 2010 7:48 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 29, 2010 3:31 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
None of the sutta citations you have supplied are referring to the theory of radical momentariness.

All the best,

Geoff


BTW, I have gone against my own inclinations by starting this thread. I have no intention of trying to change anyone’s opinion on these issues. I know that even questioning these matters which people feel deeply invested in can elicit anything from emotionally charged reactions to the outright denial of the specific issues involved. I wish that weren’t the case. Nevertheless, the elephant in the living room can be difficult to ignore.


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 5:08 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Please do show some examples of his "blunders" in the excerpt cited above.

Thanks,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 10:07 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Indeed.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 9:39 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
“Present moment” is another completely conceptual designation with no locatable referent whatsoever. When you look close enough it vanishes.

Ven. Sujato, The Mystique of the Abhidhamma:
In the later abhidhamma, the treatment of time is dominated by a radical new theory, totally unlike anything in the suttas or even the canonical abhidhamma, the theory of moments (khaṇavāda). This postulates that time is constituted of a series of discrete, indivisible units, rather like a series of billiard balls lined up on a table. Each unit, or ‘moment’, is infinitesimally small, such that billions pass by in a lightning-flash. So while the suttas emphasize the length of time, the abhidhamma emphasizes the shortness. This theory shapes the abhidhamma conception of a whole range of central doctrines. Thus impermanence becomes, not simply being subject to birth and death, rise and fall, but the momentary dissolution of phenomena – one dhamma rises and ceases in an instant, leaving no trace of residue in the next. Samadhi becomes, not an exalted, stable coalescence of mind, but a ‘momentary samadhi’ running after the fluctuations of phenomena. The path becomes, not a gradual program of spiritual development, but a ‘path-moment’, gone in a flash. And the mind itself becomes just a series of ‘mind-moments’.

Now it is quite possible to take this theory, compare it with the suttas, and refute it point by point. But here I would simply like to point out what an implausible and useless&nbsp; idea it is. Quite obviously, time may be analyzed as finely as we wish, its divisibility determined only by the sharpness of our analytical razor. Any unit of time has a beginning, a middle, and an end. That beginning, too, has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and so on ad infinitum. There is simply no good reason to postulate an ultimate substratum of time to which other strata can be reduced. This idea seems to derive some of its impressiveness from its air of acrid, pessimistic, reductionist severity, which is often mistaken as a sign of really uncompromising wisdom.

The guiding objective for the formulation of the mind-moment theory would seem to be for exactitude of definition. So while the Buddha spoke of the mind ‘changing while it stands’, the abhidhamma just speaks of ‘standing’. It is much easier to define a static entity than a process evolving over time. This is why a butterfly collector wants to have his butterflies dead, with a pin stuck through their heart and a little label underneath, not madly meandering about in the woods. The dead mind. But the Buddha was not a butterfly collector, he was an observer of nature. He wanted us to watch the flight and flitter of the butterfly, to understand how it behaves in its natural environment, and to follow it gently, delicately, quietly until it settles down to rest and be still according to its nature – which he called ‘samadhi’....

Just what is going on here? Why postulate such an odd theory, raising so many pseudo-problems, and so contrary to the suttas, to common sense, and to experience? What is occurring, I suggest, is that the domain of discourse has been shifted from the empirical to the metaphysical. The suttas treat time in a straightforward, pragmatic, empirical terms – birth, ageing, and death, the changing states of the mind, the progressive development of spiritual qualities. The purpose, the sole purpose, is to empower the practitioner to get a handle on this stuff of life, directing attention to the seat of the problem – how our attachments cause suffering, and how to find peace by letting go. But the abhidhamma aims to describe, not just the spiritual problem and its solution, but the totality of existence. Inevitably, the subjective stance of the suttas becomes objectified, and as the focus moves from meditation to study, the concepts in the books become imposed on reality; in fact, they become reality itself. The quest for truth becomes a quest for definition, and reality becomes as neatly departmentalized as a mathematical table. ‘Ultimate reality’ becomes, not what you are experiencing now, but what you read about in abhidhamma books. 

Find this hard to swallow? You might be interested to know that in contemporary abhidhamma circles it is, apparently, the orthodox position that the series of ‘mind-moments’ can only be directly seen by Buddhas, and perhaps chief disciples. This is, admittedly, challenged by some, who claim it can be seen in meditation. In just the same way, a Christian meditator will claim to see God, or a Hindu to see the universal Self. Seek and ye shall find. The very fact that such a controversy could possibly arise is a sign how far we have drifted from the Buddha’s pragmatic empiricism. This is bad enough; but even worse when we realize that the theory in question made its appearance a millennium after the Buddha’s time. This, for me, is as good as an admission that the whole thing is mere metaphysical speculation. No wonder the abhidhammikas have been so keen to father the canonical abhidhamma (and sometimes even the commentaries!) on the Buddha himself, despite massive evidence to the contrary.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 28, 2010 9:30 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Hi Alex,

This is precisely the point. The individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is relational and conventional and therefore phenomena cannot be ultimately established as “truly existing things” (sabhāvasiddhā), or “the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence” independent of the cognitive process.

Ven. Ñāṇananda, The Magic of the Mind (pp. 62-63):
According to the phenomenalistic approach of the Buddha, not only the different types of feelings and mental states but the entire range of doctrinal categories summed up under the last section [of the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta] i.e. ‘contemplation of mind-objects,’ has nothing in it that is worth ‘clinging to.’ All of them can be subsumed under the term ‘concept’ and that is to recognize their conditioned nature – the nature of arising and ceasing.

“Friends, when there is the eye and there are forms and there is eye-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact (phassapaññatti). When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling (vedanāpaññatti). When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception (saññāpaññatti). When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought (vitakkapaññatti). When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception (papañcasaññāsaṅkhāsamudācaraṇapaññatti).

“When there is the ear... When there is the nose... When there is the tongue... When there is the body...

“When there is the mind and there are mental phenomena and there is mental-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact. When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling. When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception. When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought. When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception.” – M I 112 Madhupiṇḍika Sutta

It would indeed appear strange to us that in Buddhist psychology even contact and feeling – with which we are so intimate – are treated as ‘designations’ (paññatti). We might feel that this is an intrusion of the ‘designation’ into the jealously guarded recesses of the psyche. Yet this is not the case, for, in the very act of apperception contacts and feelings are reckoned, evaluated, defined, and designated on the basis of one’s latencies (i.e. the aggregates). Thus there is hardly any justification for regarding them as ‘the given’, though we are accustomed to take them for granted. In other words, what we are wont to treat as ‘the given,’ turns out to be ‘synthetic’ and ‘composite’ (saṅkhata).

Noa Ronkin, Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a Philosophical Tradition (pp. 245-247):
The Buddha’s insight reveals that the causal foundation for one’s samsaric experience is the operation of one’s cognitive apparatus. One’s experience in its entirety arises from the cognitive process of making sense of the incoming sensory data. Basic to this process is the khandha of conceptualization and apperception, namely, sañña, the activity of which results in the identification and differentiation of the incoming data. This identification process necessarily involves naming. As Hamilton points out, in describing the way identification is part of sorting out incoming experiential data the early Buddhist texts emphasize that naming is equivalent to what is called ‘making manifold’ of those data. ‘One might say’, Hamilton suggests, ‘that the process of making manifold in order to identify is the process of making nameable the aspects of one’s experience’. Indeed the Pali term for making manifold, papañceti, also means ‘verbal differentiation’, or ‘verbal proliferation’. All this verbal differentiation adds up to language, for, as the apperceptive process develops, one is imposing on the sensory influx categories and references that can be indicated by means of language. Language, then, is intrinsic to our experience: it provides the conceptual criteria and framework by which we make sense of our experience, or rather, by which we construct our world.

The Buddha, however, unveils not only the dominance of language and conceptual thought, but also their inherent insufficiency and inadequacy. Although language is a constant feature of our experience, we are normally unaware of the paradox in the cognitive process: to become knowable all the incoming sensory data must be verbally differentiated, but as such they are mere constructions, mental formations; nothing justifies their reliability because they could equally have been constructed otherwise, in accordance with other conventional guidelines. What the Buddha rejects is realism, conceptual and ontological alike: the notion that the encountered world is made up of distinguishable substances, and the linguistic theory that words refer to these substances which they represent; the conviction that our language corresponds to or mirrors a mind-independent reality. He points towards conventionalism in language and undermines the misleading character of nouns as substance-words. Whatever we can know is part of the activity of language, but language, by its very nature, undermines certified knowledge. The Buddha shows that language is, in principle, faulty: having the power to make manifold and endlessly to proliferate, it makes things appear and disappear; it can construct anything and hence cannot be representational of reality. There can be no innocence of relations between word and world....

Stated otherwise, samsaric experience is rooted in our cognitive apparatus: to rely on our conceptual scheme and language the way we normally do amounts to emotionally and intellectually grasping at and fixing our experience. Having recognized the fiction and imaginative creation inherent in conceptual thought and language, the awakened mind breaks up the apparently solid world that we construct for ourselves. To realize that words and concepts do not name anything, do not represent anything – what could be closer to silence and the eschewal of all views?

Noticeable in this context is the Atthakavagga of the Suttanipata, which promulgates an ascetic discipline of silence and repudiation of our very cognitive apparatus as based on linguistic and conceptual delineation:

“Neither conceptualizing, nor conceptualizing wrongly, nor lacking conceptualization, nor conceptualizing nothing – in one who has achieved this state sensory recognizable experience (rupa) ceases, for what is called ‘verbal proliferation’ (papañca) has its origin in conceptualization.”

What comes to a halt according to this description is but namarupa: nama referring to all that is conceived of, thus providing an abstract, conceptual identity for the person, rupa designating the physically (though not necessarily visibly) recognizable data, that is, all that lends itself to apperception and that is given shape by means of sensory impression. Covering the range of whatever is either conceived or apperceived, namarupa therefore signifies the entirety of what is cognizable. That namarupa is related to papañca is attested by another Suttanipata passage located in the Mahavagga:

“Having understood namarupa as verbal proliferation ( papañca) that is the root of inward and outward disease, one is released from bondage to the root of all disease. Such a one is called in truth ‘one who knows well’.”

[Edit: typo]


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 9:00 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
These examples have nothing to do with the theory of radical momentariness.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 3:46 pm
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
Hello Ven. Huifeng,

The BPS Wheel publication of The Dhamma Theory was published in 1996, thirty years after the publication of his doctoral thesis. Are you suggesting that it isn't representative of his current understanding?

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 10:36 am
Title: Re: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
In The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma (p. 20), Dr. Karunadasa states:
What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas is a critical realism, one which recognizes the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that owe their being to the act of cognition itself.

And on page 22 he tells us that:
[A] dhamma is a truly existent thing (sabhavasiddha)

And on page 14:
The description of dhammas as paramattha means ... objective existence.... [T]he ultimate irreducible data of cognition are the subjective counterparts of the ultimate irreducible data of objective existence.

And so according to Dr. Karunadasa, the dhamma theory, which is the basis for the entire abhidhammika project: (1) is realist, and this is because (2) dhamma-s have ontological primacy as truly existent objective things independent of cognition.

Later I will offer some commentarial citations which may hopefully support Dr. Karunadasa's analysis of the dhamma theory.... But that's all I have time for at present.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 9:45 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi pt1,

I've taken the liberty of starting a new thread: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View. The issues now under discussion pertain directly to right view (sammādiṭṭhi). How this informs and qualifies right meditation (sammāsamādhi) is a related issue of course, but I think it's worth discussing the view first.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 9:34 am
Title: Reliability of Mahāvihāra Commentaries?... Right View
Content:
I would propose that we discuss this issue by referencing relevant citations from the commentaries, as you have done here. In addition, it would also be useful to include references and citations from contemporary authorities on the Abhidhamma and the Mahāvihāra commentarial literature. This would include both scholars and meditation teachers such as the Burmese teachers who rely strictly on Mahāvihāra abhidhammika tenets ("scholar" and "meditation teacher" are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories).

In The Dhamma Theory: Philosophical Cornerstone of the Abhidhamma, (BPS, 1996), Dr. Y. Karunadasa, an authoritative Sri Lankan Abhidhamma scholar, tells us that:
All the different modes of analysis and classification found in the Abhidhamma stem from a single philosophical principle, which gave direction and shape to the entire project of systematization. This principle is the notion that all the phenomena of empirical existence are made up of a number of elementary constituents, the ultimate realities behind the manifest phenomena. These elementary constituents, the building blocks of experience, are called dhammas. The dhamma theory is not merely one principle among others in the body of Abhidhamma philosophy but the base upon which the entire system rests.

It might be worth discussing to what degree the Mahāvihāra commentarial tenets are reliable and accurate references regarding the teaching of the Buddha (Buddhasāsana), particularly as it pertains to right view (sammādiṭṭhi), as right view is essential for right meditation (sammāsamādhi).

Specifically, it seems that there are three interrelated principles that are central to the Mahāvihāra commentarial view:
1.the dhamma theory (dhammavāda)
2.the theory of radical momentariness (khaṇavāda)
3.the theory of two truths (sammutisacca &amp; paramatthasacca)

Again, I would suggest that referencing and citing contemporary abhidhammika authorities is one way of avoiding misrepresenting the commentarial tradition as it is presently understood and taught.

Anything that you or any other member may wish to add is welcome.  

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 6:37 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
For a beginner practicing in order to develop samatha, it's usually better to start off with just mindfully attending to the simple felt-sense of pleasantness/pleasure (sukha) without attending to the characteristic of momentary flux. This specifically refers to the characteristic of alteration while persisting (ṭhitassa aññathatta), which is an aspect of the impermanence of all fabrications (saṅkhāra-s). BTW, in its sutta usage this should not be confused with the commentarial theory of radical momentariness (khaṇavāda).

Samatha at that preliminary stage of development is not yet sammāsamādhi.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 27, 2010 5:48 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi Alex,

It's quite simple. The criteria is explicitly stated in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta. The four great references (mahāpadesā) clearly explain that concerning issues regarding the clarification or authenticity of Dhammavinaya, the dhamma of the sutta-s and the rules of the vinaya are the sole authority. Any commentary or interpretation of dhamma needs to be verified by tracing it back to the sutta-s.

The Mahāvihāra claim that the dhamma referred to in the mahāpadesā includes the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, and that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka was spoken by the Buddha (excepting the Kathāvatthu), cannot be sustained because the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, as well as the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikāya, are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions which couldn't have existed at the time of the Buddha's parinibbāna.

If the compositions of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, etc., were extant at that time, and were considered to have been spoken by the Buddha, then (1) all of the early Nikāya sects would have very similar abhidhamma compositions (just as they have very similar sutta compositions); and (2) all of the early Nikāya sects would have unquestionably considered their own abhidhamma collections to have been spoken by the Buddha. Neither of these are the case. Therefore, it can safely be concluded that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the abhiddhamika exegeses now found in the Khuddakanikāya are all post-schismatic sectarian compositions.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jun 25, 2010 3:43 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
And what criteria, Alex, do you base your acceptance of one of the three above mentioned models of the cognitive process on and reject the other two?


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jun 25, 2010 2:11 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
IMO it's more about contemplating the apparent similarities and differences found in the different historical strata of received tradition. This should always be approached with a sense of humility and respect. But I would suggest that at some point one has to begin to see through and let go of the layers of conceptual filtering and hone in on the actual soteriological message of the Pāḷi discourses. I think this is primarily what Ven. Ñāṇananda has been pointing to for the past 40 years.

Sammādiṭṭhi is important. Historical accruement, not so much.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jun 25, 2010 1:19 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
The sutta is SN 22.94 (S iii 138) Puppha Sutta. And the term translated as "it exists" is atthi, which doesn't have any realist connotations whatsoever. It could well be translated as "it is." It is very far from the ontological and realist implications of the commentarial "sabhāva."

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jun 24, 2010 6:43 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Most of the venerables quoted thus far mainly teach vipassanā meditation based on the modernist Burmese method, thus the differences regarding vipassanā as a stand alone meditation practice are not as pronounced as the differences that can arise regarding jhāna.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jun 24, 2010 5:33 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Your 2nd and 3rd points don't necessarily follow from the 1st point. If that happens (i.e. #2 &amp; #3), then the meditator has strayed into wrong samādhi. Certainly, jhāna as sammāsamādhi includes samatha, vipassanā, and paññā. This is not only stated in the sutta-s, it is also explicitly stated in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi. For example, in MN 111, anupadadhammavipassanā is employed to develop paññā while remaining in jhāna:
There was the case where Sariputta — quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities — entered &amp; remained in the first jhana: rapture &amp; pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought &amp; evaluation. Whatever qualities there are in the first jhana — directed thought, evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, perception, intention, consciousness, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, &amp; attention — he ferreted them out one after another. Known to him they arose, known to him they remained, known to him they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play. Having been, they vanish.'

Bhante G. has valiantly attempted to resuscitate and realign at least some aspects of the commentarial understanding of jhāna with what is presented in the sutta-s. And while I don't necessarily agree with his methodology (I think that by employing commentarial terminology such as paṭibhāganimitta, etc., he may be bending and distorting what the commentaries actually state), at any rate, in his paper Should we come out of Jhāna to practice Vipassanā?, he says:
Do we have to come out of Jhāna in order to practice Vipassanā? Is concentration the same as absorption? If Jhānic concentration is the same as being absorbed by our object of focus then yes, we must leave Jhāna to practice Vipassanā. But, when we become absorbed into our object of focus, what we are practicing is “wrong” Jhāna. When we practice “right” Jhāna we will be able to see things as they really are....

It is virtually impossible to find evidence in the Suttas that one should come out of Jhāna to practice Vipassanā. There are a number of passages repeated in many Suttas dealing with the four fine material Jhānas. Nowhere in any of these passages is it said that one should come out of Jhāna to gain the three kinds of knowledge—knowledge of seeing previous lives, knowledge of beings dying and taking rebirth according to their kammas, and knowledge of the destruction of defilements....

The belief that one must come out of Jhāna to gain supernormal knowledge (abhiññās) or to destroy defilements and attain enlightenment is based on an assumption that the concentrated mind becomes one with the object of meditation and is absorbed into that object. For this reason some people translate Jhāna or samādhi as absorption concentration. If the mind is absorbed into the object then the mind is paralyzed and incapable of doing anything.

This may be true when the Jhāna is gained without mindfulness. This is what happened to the teachers of the Bodhisatta Gotama. They were stuck in Jhāna but they thought that they had attained enlightenment. This cannot happen when you practice Jhāna with mindfulness.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 23, 2010 3:03 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
There is little doubt that SN 48.40 is the product of rather late redaction of the sutta corpus. This can be inferred because there is no parallel in the extant Sarvāstivāda corpus, and the relevant sūtra cited in the Abhidharmakośabhāsya, the *Satyasiddhiśāstra, and the Yogācāra Śrāvakabhūmi gives an analysis of the feeling faculties in dhyāna which is closer to the standard jhāna/dhyāna formula.

Nevertheless, given that SN 48.36-48.39 define the feeling faculties the way they do, these vibhaṅga sutta-s are enough to differentiate the suttantika interpretation of SN 48.40 from how the feeling faculties in relation to jhāna are defined in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 23, 2010 2:17 pm
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
Hi Freawaru,

Respectfully, it seems that you are unwilling to acknowledge that the Pāḷi sutta-s explicitly define the four elements: the earth element (pathavīdhātu), water element (āpodhātu), fire element (tejodhātu), and the wind element (vāyodhātū), in terms of the constituent parts of the "biological body" which is one and the same as the gross body (DN 9: "I posit a gross self, possessed of form, made up of the four great existents [earth, water, fire, and wind], feeding on physical food.")

Other passages from the relevant discourses dealing with the analysis of the four elements have already been provided. Yet, you continue to insist upon reading notions into the sutta-s which simply are not stated or implied by any of the discourses dealing with the elements. 

Moreover, it seems that you are unwilling to comprehend the soteriological purpose of contemplating the elements in meditation practice. The purpose is to develop renunciation (nekkhamma), disenchantment (nibbidā), dispassion (virāga), eventually resulting in liberation (vimutti) from the continual round of rebirth and re-death which is saṃsāra. The contemplation of the elements as an application of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhāna) has nothing to do with developing the iddhi-s per se. 

And FTR, in the context of the Pāḷi sutta-s, the iddhi-s are considered mundane and superfluous. In DN 11: Kevaṭṭa Sutta the Buddha states:
Seeing this drawback to the miracle of psychic power, Kevatta, I feel horrified, humiliated, and disgusted with the miracle of psychic power....

Seeing this drawback to the miracle of telepathy, Kevatta, I feel horrified, humiliated, and disgusted with the miracle of telepathy.

If you are interested in learning in full the authentic systems of Tibetan yoga, I would recommend that you make a connection with a reputable tsaway lama, complete ngöndro and any other requisites, and save enough money or find a financial sponsor for three year retreat (if you haven't already done so). And that is just the beginning.

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 23, 2010 11:02 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
There are numerous problems with the Visuddhimagga and Aṭṭhakathā commentarial exegesis regarding jhāna. The most obvious of which are that the notions of paññatti vs. paramattha and the subsequent notion of a counterpart sign (paṭibhāganimitta), as well as the notion that the counterpart sign is merely paññatti, are all completely absent from the thought-world of the Pāḷi Nikāya-s.

Also, the commentarial exegesis doesn’t seem to be very clear on just what the actual referent is for some of the paṭibhāganimitta-s. For example, in regard to ānāpānasati the Visuddimagga 3.113 states: 
“When a man extends the sign of in-breaths and out-breaths, only a quantity of wind is extended, and it has a definite location, [the nose-tip]. So it need not be extended because of the disadvantage and because of the definiteness of the location.”

And Visuddhimagga 3.119:
“Mindfulness of breathing must be apprehended by touch.”

This seems to indicate that the parikammanimitta, uggahanimitta as well as the paṭibhāganimitta could be “paramattha.” But when we get to the descriptions of the paṭibhāganimitta for ānāpānasati we are told that:
“It appears to some like a star or a cluster of gems or a cluster of pearls, to others with a rough touch like that of silk-cotton seeds or a peg made of heartwood, to others like a long braid string or a wreath of flowers or a puff of smoke, to others like a stretched-out cobweb or a film of cloud or a lotus flower or a chariot wheel or the moon's disk or the sun's disk.”

Here we have a laundry list of many possible paṭibhāganimitta-s, most of which are mental images, but at least two of which are still within the tactile domain of experience.

Fortunately, in the sutta-s, all of the concomitant dhamma-s pertaining to jhāna are definitely not “paññatti.” Therefore one can develop both samatha and/or vipassanā as the means to enter jhāna, as well as develop vipassanā while remaining in any of the four jhāna-s. Thus the entire commentarial exegesis regarding jhāna amounts to just another instance of a foreign, intrusive, and unnecessary conceptual filter superimposed over the sutta-s, resulting in a rerouting of the path into various paths, and thereby distorting the integral harmony of the noble eightfold path.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 22, 2010 10:56 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
According to Ven. Ñāṇananda, dhamma-s "are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been arrested and split up in the realm of ideation." And in regard to the liberated mind, according to the sutta-s it is measureless (appamāṇa) and therefore can't be measured (pamāṇa) in terms of the aggregates or the forward-order sequence of DO.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 22, 2010 2:35 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi Mike,

As you can probably infer from my previous post in reply to Chris, Ven. Ñāṇananda doesn't seem to be a big fan of the two truth theory. A few more quotations are relevant. From his The Magic of the Mind, pp. 62-63:
According to the phenomenalistic approach of the Buddha, not only the different types of feelings and mental states but the entire range of doctrinal categories summed up under the last section [of the Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta] i.e. ‘contemplation of mind-objects,’ has nothing in it that is worth ‘clinging to.’ All of them can be subsumed under the term ‘concept’ and that is to recognize their conditioned nature – the nature of arising and ceasing.

“Friends, when there is the eye and there are forms and there is eye-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact (phassapaññatti). When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling (vedanāpaññatti). When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception (saññāpaññatti). When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought (vitakkapaññatti). When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception (papañcasaññāsaṅkhāsamudācaraṇapaññatti).

“When there is the ear... When there is the nose... When there is the tongue... When there is the body...

“When there is the mind and there are mental phenomena and there is mental-consciousness, it is possible that one will point out a designation of contact. When there is a designation of contact, it is possible that one will point out a designation of feeling. When there is a designation of feeling, it is possible that one will point out a designation of perception. When there is a designation of perception, it is possible that one will point out a designation of thought. When there is a designation of thought, it is possible that one will point out a designation of obsession due to reckonings born of prolific perception.” – M I 112 Madhupiṇḍika Sutta

It would indeed appear strange to us that in Buddhist psychology even contact and feeling – with which we are so intimate – are treated as ‘designations’ (paññatti). We might feel that this is an intrusion of the ‘designation’ into the jealously guarded recesses of the psyche. Yet this is not the case, for, in the very act of apperception contacts and feelings are reckoned, evaluated, defined, and designated on the basis of one’s latencies (i.e. the aggregates). Thus there is hardly any justification for regarding them as ‘the given’, though we are accustomed to take them for granted. In other words, what we are wont to treat as ‘the given,’ turns out to be ‘synthetic’ and ‘composite’ (saṅkhata).

And from his Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, p. 87:
The primary significance of the formula of Dependent Arising lies here. Lists of phenomena, both mental and material, are linked together with the term "paccayā" or any of its equivalents, and the fact of their conditionality and non-substantiality is emphasized with the help of analysis and synthesis. Apart from serving the immediate purpose of their specific application, these formulas help us to attune our minds in order to gain paññā. Neither the words in these formulas, nor the formulas as such, are to be regarded as ultimate categories. We have to look not so much at them as through them. We must not miss the wood for the trees by dogmatically clinging to the words in the formulas as being ultimate categories. As concepts, they are merely the modes in which the flux of material and mental life has been arrested and split up in the realm of ideation....

Concept and Reality, pp. 55 - 56:
Concepts – be they material or spiritual, worldly or transcendental – are not worthy of being grasped dogmatically. They are not to be treated as ultimate categories and are to be discarded in the course of the spiritual endeavour.... That the emancipated sage (muni) no longer clings even to such concepts as "nibbāna" or "detachment" (virāga) is clearly indicated in the following verse of the Sutta Nipāta:

"For the Brahmin (the Muni) who has transcended all bounds, there is nothing that is grasped by knowing or by seeing. He is neither attached to attachment nor is he attached to detachment. In this world, he has grasped nothing as the highest." [Sn 795]

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 22, 2010 2:23 am
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
Hi Chris &amp; all,

Ven. Ñāṇananda has something to say about the verse you've cited, and the commentarial interpretation of the statement from the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta. In his Concept and Reality In Early Buddhist Thought, pp. 44-45:
[T]he word ‘paramattha’ in its earlier and non-technical usage, actually meant the Highest Goal as the object of realization, and any words tending towards that goal were called ‘paramatthasaṃhita’ (connected with the Highest Goal), irrespective of their precision or technicality. However, the Buddha, for his part, was content to treat all of them as ‘sammuti’. For him, they were ‘merely worldly conventions in common use, which he made use of, without clinging to them’ (DN I 202, Poṭṭhapāda Sutta).

One wonders whether this simple though profound attitude of the Buddha towards concepts, has been properly handed down in tradition, when for instance one comes across the following verse quoted approvingly by Buddhaghosa (source unknown) in his commentary to the Anaṅgaṇa Sutta of the Majjhima Nikāya:

Duve saccāni akkhāsi, sambuddho vadataṃ varo; 
sammutiṃ paramatthañca, tatiyaṃ nūpalabbhati. 
Saṅketavacanaṃ saccaṃ, lokasammutikāraṇā; 
paramatthavacanaṃ saccaṃ, dhammānaṃ bhūtakāraṇā. 
Tasmā vohārakusalassa, lokanāthassa satthuno; 
sammutiṃ voharantassa, musāvādo na jāyati.

[Translation of verse similar to what Chris has supplied.]

If one can appreciate the significance of the term ‘nippapañca,’ one might realize that the Buddha could magnanimously afford to dispense with such naïve defenses as the above, against any charges of his having violated the fourth precept.

And also, in his The Mind Stilled, Nibbāna Sermon 13:
[Nibbāna] is not a paramattha in the sense of an absolute. It is a paramattha only in the sense that it is the highest good, parama attha. This is the sense in which the word was used in the discourses, though it has different connotations now. As exemplified by such quotations as āraddhaviriyo paramatthapattiyā, "with steadfast energy for the attainment of the highest good," the suttas speak of Nibbāna as the highest good to be attained.

In later Buddhist thought, however, the word paramattha came to acquire absolutist connotations, due to which some important discourses of the Buddha on the question of worldly appellations, worldly expressions and worldly designations fell into disuse. This led to an attitude of dwelling in the scaffolding, improvised just for the purpose of constructing a building....

t is not proper to relegate some sermons as discursive or conventional in style. Always it is a case of using concepts in worldly parlance. In the laboratory one uses a particular set of symbols, but on returning home he uses another. In the same way, it is not possible to earmark a particular bundle of concepts as absolute and unchangeable. As stated in the Poṭṭhapādasutta, already discussed, all these concepts are worldly appellations, worldly expressions, worldly usages, worldly designations, which the Tathāgata makes use of without tenacious grasping. However philosophical or technical the terminology may be, the arahants make use of it without grasping it tenaciously. What is of importance is the function it fulfills. We should make use of the conceptual scaffolding only for the purpose of putting up the building. As the building comes up, the scaffolding has to leave. It has to be dismantled. If one simply clings onto the scaffolding, the building would never come up.


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 8:42 pm
Title: Re: Samatha v. vipassana?
Content:
In Seeing Through: A Guide to Insight Meditation, Ven. Ñāṇananda explains the development of vipassanā without any reliance on the awkward two truths theory:
At the preliminary stage, one avoids the usual mode of attention in the world such as 'woman', 'woman', 'man', 'man' in the case of a visual object, thus dispensing with those details which lead to various unskillful states of mind and attends to those visual objects in such a way as not to encourage those unskillful mental states. So one is content with attending to those visual or auditory objects as 'form' or 'sound'.

However as one proceeds in Insight Meditation, one comes to reflect that in this mode of attention, there is present a certain illusion - a wrong notion one has been cherishing throughout 'saṁsāra'. That is, the concept of two ends and a middle. When one notes a visual object as 'a form' and an auditory object as 'a sound', there is a kind of bifurcation between the eye and form, the ear and the sound. So thereby one is perpetuating the illusion, the wrong notion, of two ends. Whenever there are the two ends, there is also the middle. In short, this way of mental noting leaves room for a subject-object relationship. There is the meditator on one side, whoever it may be, and there is the object that comes to his mind; and he attends to it as an object, even though he may not go into its details. Now the meditator has to break through this barrier as well. He has to break this bondage. Why?

In the case of 'saññā' or perception, there are the six kinds of percepts - rūpa saññā, sadda saññā, gandha saññā, rasa saññā, phoṭṭhabba saññā, dhamma saññā (i.e., the percepts of form, sound, smell, taste, touch and idea). These are the six objects of the senses. The Buddha has compared the aggregate of perception to a mirage. Now if perception is mirage, what is 'rūpa saññā' or a visual percept? That also must be a mirage. What about 'sadda saññā'? What about the auditory percept or what strikes the ear? That too must be a mirage. Though it is not something that one sees with the eye, it has the nature of a mirage.

To take as real what is of a mirage-nature, is a delusion. It is something that leads to a delusion. It is an illusion that leads to a delusion. In order to understand deeply this mirage-nature in sensory perception, there is a need for a more refined way of mental attending. So the meditator, instead of attending to these objects as 'form', 'form' or 'sound', 'sound', moves a step further and notes them as 'seeing' or 'hearing'. Now he attends to these sense-percepts even more briefly, not allowing the mind to go far - as 'seeing- seeing ', 'hearing- hearing', 'feeling-feeling','thinking-thinking'.

In short, the attempt here, is to escape the net of 'saññā' or perception and to limit oneself to the bare awareness. To stop short just at the bare awareness. This is an attempt to escape the net of language, the net of logic and also to be free from the duality of two ends which involves a middle. Everywhere one is confronted with a subject-object relationship. There is one who grasps and something to be grasped. There is a seer and an object seen. But this way of attending leaves room for delusion.

Now, if perception is a mirage, in order to get at this mirage nature, one has to be content with attending simply as 'seeing, seeing'. One way or the other it is just a seeing or just a hearing. Thereby he stops short at the bare awareness. He stops short at the bare seeing, bare hearing, bare feeling and bare thinking. He does not grant it an object status. He does not cognize it as an object existing in the world. He does not give it a name. The purpose of this method of mental noting or attending, is the eradication of the conceit 'AM', which the meditator has to accomplish so a to attain release. The conceit 'AM' is 'asmi-māna'. 
And later in the same teaching:
All the delusion in the world is traceable to the illusion that is in perception - 'saññā'. It is because of 'saññā' or perception that knots and grips occur, so much so that one who is free from 'saññā' is free from knots and grips also. That is why it is said in the Māgandiya Sutta of the Sutta Nipata.

'Saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā
Paññāvimuttassa na santi mohā'

'To one detached from perception there are no knots and to one released through wisdom there are no delusions.'

So the purpose of this training in insight is that release from perception. Until full detachment with regard to perception sets in, knotting will go on. A sort of disgust or disenchantment has to occur for detachment to set in. With the gradual refinement of the mode of mental noting, one is able to eliminate these knots brought about by perception.

It seems possible that some of the abhidhammika proponents of the two truth theory may forget to take into account that the entire forward-order sequence of DO is a process of deluded cognition. The whole game needs to be shut down. In practice, analyzing deluded cognition in terms of real/unreal just prolongs the game.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 6:04 pm
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
MN 1 shows that there's no need to ever read any realist ontology or metaphysics of any sort into the discourses.


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 11:33 am
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
Some are full of hot air....


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 9:39 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Hi Sylvester,

Good to hear from you again. I hope you had a fruitful retreat.

AN 6.63 (A iii 410):

Api ca kho, bhikkhave, nete kāmā, kāmaguṇā nāmete ariyassa vinaye vuccanti –
Saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo,
Nete kāmā yāni citrāni loke.

Here:

kāmā are not the same as kāmaguṇā
kāma is not the same as yāni citrāni loke
kāma is equated with saṅkapparāgo

[edit: typo]


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 9:30 am
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
Hi Freawaru,

Actually it is precisely the other way around: earth (solidity), water (cohesion), fire (temperature), and air (motility) are considered primary. All other forms, both internal and external, are derived from these four great existents ((mahābhūtā). 

Could you please clarify what you mean by a "biological body" (preferably with reference to the discourses) which is something different from: head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, membranes, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, contents of the stomach, feces, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's hard, solid, and sustained; bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, oil, saliva, mucus, oil-of-the-joints, urine, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's liquid, watery, &amp; sustained; that by which [the body] is warmed, aged, &amp; consumed with fever; and that by which what is eaten, drunk, consumed &amp; tasted gets properly digested; or anything else internal, within oneself, that's fire, fiery, &amp; sustained; up-going winds, down-going winds, winds in the stomach, winds in the intestines, winds that course through the body, in-and-out breathing, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's wind, windy, &amp; sustained; the holes of the ears, the nostrils, the mouth, the [passage] whereby what is eaten, drunk, consumed, &amp; tasted gets swallowed, and where it collects, and whereby it is excreted from below, or anything else internal, within oneself, that's space, spatial, &amp; sustained; cognizing 'pleasure,' cognizing 'pain,' cognizing 'neither pleasure nor pain.'


Author: Nyana
Date: Mon Jun 21, 2010 1:10 am
Title: Re: On "Visuddhimagga Jhanas"
Content:
By all means, anyone interested in the teachings of any particular teacher should make a connection with that teacher and follow their instructions accordingly.


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 20, 2010 11:53 pm
Title: Re: On "Visuddhimagga Jhanas"
Content:
Hi Mike &amp; Oleksandr,

Ajahn Brahm correlates his experience of what he designates as "jhāna" with a very selective and narrow reading of a few sutta-s. Such an interpretation doesn't accurately represent what the sutta-s actually have to say on the matter.

Similarly, Ven. Pa Auk Sayadaw teaches what he designates as "jhāna" based on a very narrow reading of the Visuddhimagga.

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 20, 2010 8:05 pm
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
Hi Freawaru,

In the Pāḷi sutta-s the parts of the body are forms derived from the four great existents (mahābhūtā). SN 22.56 (S iii 59) Upādānaparivatta Sutta:
And what is form? The four great existents and the form derived from them: this is called form. From the origination of nutriment comes the origination of form. From the cessation of nutriment comes the cessation of form. And just this noble eightfold path is the path of practice leading to the cessation of form, i.e., right view, right resolve, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration.

SN 22.79 (S iii 86): Khajjanīya Sutta:
And why do you call it 'form'? Because it is afflicted, thus it is called 'form.' Afflicted with what? With cold &amp; heat &amp; hunger &amp; thirst, with the touch of flies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, &amp; reptiles. Because it is afflicted, it is called form.

For an analysis of the six elements as they pertain to a living sentient being, see MN 140: Dhātuvibhaṅga Sutta.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 20, 2010 12:50 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
It isn't a problem at all. IMO the few occurrences which list five factors are not as old as the basic jhāna formula. At any rate, the list of five factors doesn't add or take away anything from the formula for the first jhāna.


Author: Nyana
Date: Sun Jun 20, 2010 12:39 pm
Title: Re: The jhana debate
Content:
Please see MN 119: Kāyagatāsati Sutta section on jhāna.


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jun 18, 2010 5:41 pm
Title: Re: how to stop controlling breath
Content:
Developing kindness and compassion for yourself – for the uncomfortable feeling that is present – is also very helpful. Even if you can only develop a little bit of kindness or compassion at first. With practice this can lead to more expansive kindness and compassion. You can recognize that there are many others who experience all sorts of similar feelings – and in some cases, far more painful feelings. Then you can extend kindness and compassion to them as well.

Best wishes,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 16, 2010 9:47 pm
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
As I said, it is likely that he had a high level of development with regard to concentration (samādhi). What he lacked was right view (sammādiṭṭhi). Therefore his way of practice (paṭipadā) wasn't conducive as a path to arahantship (arahattamagga), and his samādhi wasn't sammāsamādhi. The instruction he received from the Buddha enabled him to discern right view, and with that the other seven components of the noble eightfold path quickly aligned.


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 16, 2010 5:37 pm
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
Very true RYB.


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 16, 2010 5:33 pm
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
Hi Alex,

Another sutta tells us that Ven. Bāhiya had the capacity for sharp understanding (khippābhiññā). And as a dedicated ascetic, it is quite probable that Bāhiya was already at a high level of development with regard to ethical conduct (sīla) and concentration (samādhi). So I would suggest that Ven. Bāhiya was already quite highly developed when he earnestly set out to find the Buddha after being rebuked by the deva. 

Ven. Bāhiya was no "average Joe."  

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 16, 2010 4:25 am
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
Of course.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 15, 2010 10:21 pm
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
The "long preparations" necessary in order to attain the fourth jhāna and realize triple knowledge require the previous development of jhāna. This is implied in the discourses which describe the path –- being integral components of the gradual training.

The possibility of rare cases where one realizes the triple knowledge without much prior meditation practice is more of a theoretical hypothesis than something which accords with the life-experience of any long term practitioner that I know. I'm not saying that it would be impossible, but that it would be a very rare occurrence.

Even if one employs abhidhammika terminology, the concomitant arising of all the mental factors associated with lokuttarajjhāna (as listed in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi for example), would require a great deal of proficiency in the development of sīla, samādhi (jhāna in the suttantika sense), and paññā.

All the best,

Geoff


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 15, 2010 9:17 pm
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
According to the discourses it is quite clear. The difficulty arises when one reads abhidhammika terms and categories into the discourses. Ven. Brahmāli Jhāna and Lokuttarajjhāna:
Samādhi and jhāna are terms used in the Suttanta-bhājaniya and thus they refer to Sutta usage. In particular, as they are closely related to the above mentioned sets that constitute the path to Enlightenment, they are factors of that same path. Lokuttarajjhāna, on the other hand, belongs to the Abhidhamma-bhājaniya and is a term for the constellation of mental factors present at the moments of Enlightenment. Being a term peculiar to the Abhidhamma-bhājaniya, it only relates to the Abhidhamma and can therefore not be used to explain samādhi or jhāna as it appears in the Suttas. If this is correct, it follows that the Commentaries make a dangerous blunder when they explain jhāna and samādhi with Abhidhamma terminology that was never capable of being used in this way. 
Ven. Ṭhānissaro, Wings to Awakening:
[W]hat jhāna means in the commentaries is something quite different from what it means in the Canon. Because of this difference we can say that the commentaries are right in viewing their type of jhāna as unnecessary for Awakening, but Awakening cannot occur without the attainment of jhāna in the canonical sense.


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 15, 2010 5:08 am
Title: Re: Touching with the body vs knowing through wisdom
Content:
SN 12.70 (S ii 121) Susima Sutta tells of arahant-s who were liberated through discernment but hadn't realized any of the other five higher gnoses (abhiñña-s) or the formless attainments. 

MN 70 (M i 477) Kīṭāgiri Sutta and AN 9.44 (A iv 452) Paññāvimutta Sutta tell us that to be liberated through discernment one does so via at least the first jhāna. Thus the arahant-s in SN 12.70 were able to attain at least the first jhāna (in the suttantika sense of jhāna).

Liberated both ways (ubhatobhāgavimutta) is usually understood to have both the jhāna-s and formless attainments, as well as the attainment of the cessation of apperception and feeling (saññāvedayitanirodha). There is an abhidhamma distinction between those liberated both ways who don't attain cessation of apperception and feeling and those who do. I can't remember if this is specifically addressed in the sutta-s.


Author: Nyana
Date: Fri Jun 11, 2010 7:23 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Indeed they are. I forgot to mention the following from SN 47.6 (S v 146), which differentiates between the kāmaguṇa-s and the four satipaṭṭhāna-s. It's worth remembering in this regard that the contemplation of the body satipaṭṭhāna includes objects of contemplation such as mindfulness of breathing, the foul parts of the body, and the stages of corpse decomposition. Clearly the body, the tactile sensations associated with the breath, the 32 parts of the body, and the stages of corpse decomposition are not considered to be "strings of sensuality." SN 47.6 (S v 146):

"[Y]ou should not wander into what is not your proper range and is the territory of others. In one who wanders into what is not his proper range and is the territory of others, Mara gains an opening, Mara gains a foothold. And what, for a monk, is not his proper range and is the territory of others? The five strands of sensuality. Which five? Forms cognizable by the eye — agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. Sounds cognizable by the ear... Aromas cognizable by the nose... Flavors cognizable by the tongue... Tactile sensations cognizable by the body — agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, fostering desire, enticing. These, for a monk, are not his proper range and are the territory of others.

"Wander, monks, in what is your proper range, your own ancestral territory. In one who wanders in what is his proper range, his own ancestral territory, Mara gains no opening, Mara gains no foothold. And what, for a monk, is his proper range, his own ancestral territory? The four frames of reference. Which four? There is the case where a monk remains focused on the body in &amp; of itself — ardent, alert, &amp; mindful — putting aside greed &amp; distress with reference to the world. He remains focused on feelings in &amp; of themselves... mind in &amp; of itself... mental qualities in &amp; of themselves — ardent, alert, &amp; mindful — putting aside greed &amp; distress with reference to the world. This, for a monk, is his proper range, his own ancestral territory."


Author: Nyana
Date: Thu Jun 10, 2010 9:22 pm
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
See above.

[edit: typo]


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 09, 2010 11:54 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
It is saññā.


Author: Nyana
Date: Wed Jun 09, 2010 1:14 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
According to the post-canonical abhidhammika analysis, it is designated as cittaja rūpa: "mind produced form."


Author: Nyana
Date: Tue Jun 08, 2010 2:08 am
Title: Re: Tha jhana debate
Content:
Indeed. Sammāsamādhi.

